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Abstract
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) system has been widely utilized at many
present business areas. However, SOA system is loosely coupled with multiple
services and lacks the relevant security protection mechanisms, thus it can easily
be attacked by unauthorized access and information theft. The existed access
control mechanism can only prevent unauthorized users from accessing the sys-
tem, but they can not prevent those authorized users (insiders) from attacking
the system. To address this problem, we propose a behavior-aware service ac-
cess control mechanism using security policy monitoring for SOA system. In our
mechanism, a monitor program can supervise consumer’s behaviors in run time.
By means of trustful behavior model (TBM), if finding the consumer’s behav-
ior is of misusing, the monitor will deny its request. If finding the consumer’s
behavior is of malicious, the monitor will early terminate the consumer’s access
authorizations in this session or add the consumer into the Blacklist, whereby
the consumer will not access the system from then on. In order to evaluate
the feasibility of proposed mechanism, we implement a prototype system. The
final results illustrate that our mechanism can effectively monitor consumer’s
behaviors and make effective responses when malicious behaviors really occur
in run time. Moreover, as increasing the rule’s number in TBM continuously,
our mechanism can still work well.
Keywords: SOA, security policy, access control, runtime monitoring, cloud
service.
1. Introduction
. In cloud computing era, massive free cloud services and low-cost comput-
ing resources are driving more and more enterprises to migrate their business
processes into the cloud for the purpose of maximizing their profits. As an im-
portant enabling technique, service-oriented architecture (SOA) allows service
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consumers to build their flexible customized systems which integrate multiple
piece of component services into one big service composition [1]. Since can
implement the interconnection between heterogeneous systems with low cost,
SOA system has been widely utilized at present different business areas, such
as healthcare, education, government and e-commerce [2]. Especially with the
rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT), SOA-based IoT has been pro-
posed and attracted more attentions in recent years [3][4]. However, SOA system
is loosely coupled with multiple cloud services or some device services deployed
in edge servers [3], lacks the relevant security protection mechanisms, thus it
can easily be attacked by unauthorized access and information theft. In SOA
system, service requests may come from service consumers, intermediate ser-
vices or both of them. Consumers and intermediate services may be distributed
in different trust domains, thus service invocations across trust domains will
incur new challenges for service access authorization management. For service
consumers, the services they invoke probably need to access the other services
to fulfill some additional requirements. In this case, the sensitive data carried in
the request may be forwarded to the other distrusted services, which inevitably
may lead to the potential information leakage for service consumers [5].
. The access control mechanism has been introduced to solve the problems of
illegal and unauthorized access in SOA system. But traditional access control
mechanisms, such as identity-based access control (IBAC) [6], role-based access
control (RBAC) [7], are vulnerable when facing insider attacks, i.e., insiders
misuse their privileges for malicious purposes [8]. That is, traditional access
control mechanism can only prevent unauthorized users from accessing the sys-
tem, but due to lacking effective user behavior monitoring mechanism, they
can not prevent those authorized users (insiders) from attacking the system,
e.g., high-frequency access to services incurs the paralysis of entire system. To
address these problems, runtime monitoring and assertion checking need to be
introduced as means to enforce the security of SOA system [9]. Runtime execu-
tion monitoring (REM) is a class of methods of tracking the temporal behavior
of an underlying application, REM methods range from simple print statement
logging methods to run-time tracking of complete formal requirements for veri-
fication purposes [10].
. Based on these insights, we propose a behavior-aware service access control
mechanism using security policy monitoring for SOA system. The primary
goal our mechanism wants to reach has two perspectives. The first one is to
implement fine-grained service access control by defining service releasing policy.
Service releasing policy is defined by service provider, which strictly regulate
which service in SOA system could be accessed by which service consumer for
what target. Another perspective is to implement runtime monitoring by using
trustful behavior model (TBM) and behavior-aware access control algorithm.
By means of TBM, behavior-aware access control algorithm run in the monitor
can supervise consumer’s behaviors in run time. When consumer’s behavior is
judged to be malicious behavior, the monitor will adjust the consumer’s access
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authorizations and prevent the consumer from continuing to use the system
automatically.
. In summary, this paper makes the following contributions: (1) We propose a
system model by which we can formalize a SOA system. (2) Based on the system
model, we propose a behavior-aware service access control mechanism using se-
curity policy monitoring, which consists of service releasing policy (SRM), trust-
ful behavior model (TBM), behavior risk measurement models and behavior-
aware access control algorithm. (3) We implement a proof-of-concept experi-
mental system, whereby we can evaluate the effectiveness and performance of
our proposed mechanism.
. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
system model. Section 3 is the main body of this paper, where we presents
our proposed mechanism in detail. Section 4 implements the mechanism and
evaluates its effectiveness and performance. Section 5 reviews some related
works regarding to runtime monitoring for SOA system. Finally, Section 6
concludes this paper and presents some future directions.
2. System Model
. In this paper, we only consider the SOA systems with single trust domain,
i.e., if a service provider is the owner of SOA system, the service provider can
define the security policy for entire SOA system. Following, we first establish
the accurate formal definitions for modeling service provider, service consumer
and SOA system respectively. Then, based on these definitions, we utilize an
example to illustrate how to establish the SOA system model in detail.
Definition 1. (Service Provider): Service provider is the owner of SOA sys-
tem. It is defined as follows. SP=〈 Pi, PKi 〉, where: Pi is the identity of
service provider in SOA system. PKi is the private key of service provider in
SOA system.
Definition 2. (Service Consumer): Service consumer is the user of SOA sys-
tem. It is defined as follows. SC=〈 Ci, CKi 〉, where: Ci is the identity of
service consumer in SOA system. CKi is the private key of service consumer in
SOA system.
Definition 3. (SOA System): SOA system is a service composition with single
trust domain. It is defined as follows. SOA=〈 S, T , I0, UR, L 〉, where:
S=SS∪DS is a finite set of services. SS is a finite set of system services,
DS is a finite set of sensitive services. System services can be accessed by
any consumers, while sensitive services are those services which have massive
sensitive data or privacies, thus they are protected by system and can only be
accessed by those authorized users who are defined by service provider directly.
T ⊆ S × S is a finite set of directed transitions. If ∃si, sj ∈ S, then the pair
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tk={si, sj} is a transition from service si to service sj . I0 ∈ S is the initial
service of SOA system. UR is a finite set of uniform resource identifier (URI) of
service interface. L is a function L : S → UR, and ∀si, sj ∈ S, L(si) 6= L(sj).
And if ui ∈ UR, sj ∈ S, then L(sj)=ui represents the URI of sj ’s interface is
at ui.
Example 1. The electronic medical records sharing system (EMRSS) is a typ-
ical SOA system used in healthcare. By means of EMRSS, medical facility can
manage their patients’ electronic medical records (EMR) and share these records
with medical experts for disease treatments. We assume that Bob is the service
provider of an EMRSS. The EMRSS can provide two categories of sensitive ser-
vices, i.e., electrocardiogram (ECG) services and X-Ray image services. ECG
services can be further divided into ECG online exploring service and ECG up-
dating service. X-Ray image service can only provide image online exploring ser-
vice. If we let S1 is X-Ray image online exploring service, S3 is ECG online ex-
ploring service, S4 is ECG updating service, then the EMRSS can be modelled as
a SOA system model shown in Figure 1. Here SS={S0, S2}, DS={S1, S3, S4},
T ={t1, t2, t3, t4}, I0={ S0 }, UR={ /SBA/0.jsp, /SBA/X0.jsp, /SBA/1.jsp,
/SBA/X1.jsp, /SBA/X2.jsp }, L={L(S0)= /SBA/0.jsp, L(S1)= /SBA/X0.jsp,
L(S2)= /SBA/1.jsp, L(S3)= /SBA/X1.jsp, L(S4)= /SBA/X2.jsp}.
3. Behavior-aware Service Access Control mechanism
. Based on the SOA system model mentioned above, we propose a behavior-
aware service access control mechanism using security policy monitoring. In
some sense, this mechanism can be thought as a combination of fine-grained
service access control and runtime monitoring. In the following of this section,
we first present the entire mechanism. Then we introduce two important formal
model, service releasing model and trustful behavior model. Next, we present
a group risk quantitative measurement models for evaluating user’s behavior
risks in SOA system. Finally, we give the detailed algorithmic description of
behavior-aware access control algorithm in our mechanism.
3.1. Mechanism Description
. The proposed mechanism can be described as a flow chart shown in Figure
2. The primary goal our mechanism wants to reach has two perspectives, The
first one is to implement fine-grained service access control by defining service
releasing policy. Another perspective is to implement runtime monitoring by
using trustful behavior model and behavior-aware access control algorithm.
. Thus, we design an architecture based on check points and a monitor for our
mechanism. Check point is a section of script code embedded in each service
interface of SOA system, which is responsible for collecting service consumer
(SC)’s behavior elements, such as identity, location, IP address and etc. Moni-
tor is designed as an independent supervising program which is responsible for
monitoring SC’s behaviors in run time.
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. Firstly, service provider (SP) defines a service releasing policy (SRM), which
is stored in the monitor and strictly regulates which sensitive service in system
could be released to which SC for what target. Here releasing a sensitive service
refers to the sensitive service could be accessed or operated by SC. Then SRM
will be converted into a group corresponding trustful behavior models (TBM)
for different SCs. Each TBM is a set of trustful behavior rules which are taken
as the criterion of behavior-aware access control algorithm. After that, once a
service invoked by SC, the monitor will be activated automatically. The be-
havior elements of SC collected by check point will be sent to the monitor for
analysing. If SC’s access request doesn’t meet TBM, monitor will deny SC’s
request because the current behavior is unpermitted. If finding SC’s behaviors
have malicious intentions, i.e., the new behavior risk calculated by risk measure-
ment models has exceeded its risk threshold, monitor will early terminate the
SC’s access authorization in this session for guaranteeing the security of system.
In this case, SC will not access any services in system, but also can access the
system in next new session.
3.2. Service Releasing Policy
. Leveraging P-Spec policy specification language we proposed in reference [11],
we can formalize SP’s service releasing policy as formal P-Spec policy model. By
means of SRM, SP can precisely define which sensitive service could be released
to which SC for what target. The relative definitions are as follows.
Definition 4. (service Releasing Rule): Given system SOA, DS ⊂SOA.
Each service releasing rule RRi is defined as follows: I(N )= {Authentication,
Authorization}. I(K)={SC, CK, Target, Service}, where SC represents a
service consumer, CK represents the SC’s private key in system, Target rep-
resents a specific purpose, Service represents a sensitive service which could
be released to the SC for Target. I(V)={Ci, CKi, Ti, Xi}, where Ci is the
corresponding variable of keyword DU , CKi is the corresponding variable of
keyword CK, Ti is the corresponding variable of keyword Target, Xi is the
corresponding variable of keyword Serivce, and ∀Xi ∈ DS. I(R) is defined as
follows:
RRi ::= Authentication→ Authorization
Authentication ::= (SC = Ci)&&(CK = CKi)
&&(Target = Tj)
Authorization ::= (Service = Xk)
| Authorization || Authorizaiton
(1)
Where The symbol = represents semantical equal, the symbol || represents log-
ical or, and the symbol → represents logical imply to. Semantically, each RRi
regulates if service consumer Ci whose private key CKi and target Tj can pass
the authentication, then Ci will be granted the relevant authorizations to access
or operate these sensitive services {Xi} accordingly.
Definition 5. (Service Releasing Model): Service Releasing model is defined
as a set of RRi rules, we denote it as: SRM = {RR0, RR1, ..., RRn}.
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Example 2. Following the background of example 1, we assume that Dr. Mike
is a cardiologist, he requires patient’s electrocardiogram (ECG) and chest X-ray
images for treating cardiopathy. Dr. Mary is an internist, she requires patient’s
chest X-ray images for treating influenza. Thus, both Mike and Mary are of
service consumers. As service provider, Bob has authorized Dr. Mike and Dr.
Mary to access the EMRSS. Due to all ECG and X-Ray images being of sensitive
privacies for patients, thus Mike and Mary can’t download or update any data
except exploring them online. Hence, SRM can be defined as follows. Firstly, let
C0 = Mike, CK0 = Mike’s private key in system, C1 = Mary, CK1 = Mary’s
private key in system, T0 = cardiopathy, T1 = influenza, X0 = X-Ray exploring
service, X1 = ECG exploring service. Then, SRM is the set {RR0, RR1} and
shown in Table 1.
Table 1: The established SRM.
RR0 (SC = C0)&&(CK = CK0)&&(Target = T0) → (Service = X0)||(Service = X1)
RR1 (SC = C1)&&(CK = CK1)&&(Target = T1) → (Service = X0)
3.3. Trustful Behavior Model
. In some sense, our SRM is similar with the existed role-based access control
(RBAC) or attribute-based access control (ABAC). RBAC or ABAC can also
authenticate a SC’s legitimacy, and grant the SC with relevant authorizations.
But they can’t monitor an authenticated SC’s behaviors in run time. Hence,
we introduce a trustful behavior model (TBM), which is converted from SRM
and can assist the monitor to supervise an authenticated users’ behaviors in run
time. The relative definitions are as follows.
Definition 6. (Trusted Behavior Rule): Each trustful behavior rule RBi is
defined as a 3-tuple: 〈Id, Src, Dst〉, where Id is the identification of a SC, Src
is the URI of current service interface, Dst is the URI of target service interface.
Semantically, each RBi rule represents if a SC whose identity equals Id wants
to invoke the target service Dst from the current service Src, then the behavior
is believed trustful for SP, otherwise it is distrustful.
Definition 7. (Model Conversion): Given system model SOA and SRM ,
∃RRj ∈ SRM whose SC=Ci. If ∀Xk ∈ RRj , there still exists a route rtk={
t0, t1,...,tm } ⊂ T in SOA, whose initial service is I0 ∈ SOA and the end
service is Xk, then set {Ci, ti} can be converted into a group of corresponding
trustful behavior rules {RBtiXk}, and the conversion procedure can be defined
as a function.
{Ci, ti} → {RB
ti
Xk
} =


〈Ci, L(Sp), L(Sq)〉
〈Ci, L(Sp), L(Sp)〉
〈Ci, L(Sq), L(Sq)〉
(2)
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Where ti={Sp, Sq} ∈ rtk, L(Sp) ∈ L is the URI of Sp’s service interface,
L(Sq) ∈ L is the URI of Sq’s service interface. Semantically, equation (2)
represents the set {Ci, tn} can be converted into three trustful behavior rules
respectively, the first rule represents the behavior of invoking service Sq from
service Sp, the second rule represents the behavior of refreshing Sp’s client, and
the third one represents the behavior of refreshing Sq’s client.
Definition 8. (Trusted Behavior Model): Given system model SOA and
SRM , ∃RRj ∈ SRM whose SC=Ci has releasing service set X={X0, X1,...,Xn
}. If ∀Xk ∈ X , there still exists a route rtk={ t0, t1,...,tm } ⊂ T in SOA, whose
initial service is I0 ∈ SOA and the end service is Xk, then trusted behavior
model of Ci denoted as TBM
Ci can be converted from set X and set RT ={
rt0, rt1,...,rtn }, and the conversion procedure can be defined as a function.
TBMCi =
n⋃
k=0
(
m⋃
i=0
{RBtiXk}) (3)
Where ti ∈ rtk, rtk ∈ RT , Xk ∈ X , |X |=|RT |. Here {RB
ti
Xk
} is the set of all
trusted behavior rules converted from SOA and SRM using equation (2).
. Based on SRM in Table 1 and SOA system model in Figure 1, we can create
the trustful behavior model for Dr.Mike and Dr. Mary respectively. Firstly,
according to SRM, releasing service set of Mike is {X0, X1}, and releasing
service of Mary is {X0}. Then in SOA, the route from I0 to X0 is transition set
{t1}, the route from I0 to X1 is transition set {t2, t3}, and the entire derivation
process can be depicted in Figure 3. Next using equation (2) and (3), TBM of
Mike and Mary can be established and shown in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively.
Table 2: Trusted behavior model of Mike.
RB0 〈 C0, /SBA/0.jsp, /SBA/X0.jsp 〉
RB1 〈 C0, /SBA/0.jsp, /SBA/0.jsp 〉
RB2 〈 C0, /SBA/X0.jsp, /SBA/X0.jsp 〉
RB3 〈 C0, /SBA/0.jsp, /SBA/1.jsp 〉
RB4 〈 C0, /SBA/1.jsp, /SBA/1.jsp 〉
RB5 〈 C0, /SBA/1.jsp, /SBA/X1.jsp 〉
RB6 〈 C0, /SBA/X1.jsp, /SBA/X1.jsp 〉
3.4. Risk Measurement Model
. In order to find and capture user’s malicious behaviors during run time, we
need to evaluate the user’s behavior using quantitative risk measurement mod-
els. If a SC’s behavior risk has exceeded its threshold, then we think the SC’s
behavior has malicious intentions. In this case, system will early terminate the
SC’s access authorization in this session. The relative risk measurement models
are defined as follows.
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Table 3: Trusted behavior model of Mary.
RB0 〈 C1, /SBA/0.jsp, /SBA/X0.jsp 〉
RB1 〈 C1, /SBA/0.jsp, /SBA/0.jsp 〉
RB2 〈 C1, /SBA/X0.jsp, /SBA/X0.jsp 〉
Definition 9. (Behavior Element): Behavior element of SC is an environment
variable collected by check point embedded in service interface. The set of
behavior elements is defined as E = { e1, e2,...,en}.
Definition 10. (Behavior Risk): Given a behavior element ei ∈ E , the risk of
behavior ei is defined as a function.
R(ei, ti+1) = F(ei, ti) (4)
The equation (4) represents the new behavior risk at time ti+1 is determined by
the existed risk at time ti.
Definition 11. (Unauthorized Access Risk): Given TBMCi and behavior
element set A={ eid, esrc, edst }, A ⊂ E , where eid is SC’s identify, esrc is the
URI of current service and edst is the URI of target service. If ∃RBj ∈ TBMCi,
and RBj={ Id, Src, Dst }, makes eid=Id, esrc=Src, edst=Dst, then SC’s
unauthorized access risk (UAF) is defined as follows.
UAF = R(A, ti) (5)
Otherwise, it is defined as follows.
UAF = R(A, ti) + 1 (6)
Where R(A, ti) is the existed unauthorized access risk.
Definition 12. (Access Retention Risk): If et ∈ E is the environment time,
then access retention risk (ARR) is defined as follows.
ARR = R(et, ti) + (ti+1 − ti) (7)
Where R(et, ti) is the existed access retention risk.
Definition 13. (Access Frequency Risk): If ef ∈ E is the times of SC accessing
services, then access frequency risk (AFR) is defined as follows.
AFR =
ef (ti+1)− ef (ti)
ti+1 − ti
(8)
where ef (ti+1) is the times of SC accessing services at the time ti+1, ef (ti) is
the times of SC accessing services at the time ti.
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Definition 14. (Risk Evaluation): Given a behavior element ei ∈ E , R(ei, ti)
is the behavior risk at the time ti, then the risk evaluation towards R(ei, ti) is
defined as follows.
E(R(ei, ti)) = 1−
θ(ei)
R(ei, ti)
(9)
Where θ(ei) is the risk threshold of behavior ei.
Definition 15. (Risk Evidence): Given a behavior element ei ∈ E , R(ei, ti)
is the behavior risk at the time ti, the risk evaluation towards R(ei, ti) is
E(R(ei, ti)), then the risk evidence towards R(ei, ti) is defined as follows.
PF (R(ei, ti)) =
{
1, E(R(ei, ti)) > 0
0, E(R(ei, ti)) ≤ 0
(10)
Semantically, if E(R(ei, ti)) > 0, it represents the accumulated risk R(ei, ti)
has exceeded the risk threshold at the time ti, thus the risk evidence is set to 1
(true). If E(R(ei, ti)) ≤ 0, then risk R(ei, ti) is still acceptable at the time ti,
thus we set the evidence to 0 (false).
3.5. Behavior-aware Access Control Algorithm
. The behavior-aware access control algorithm can be described as a flow chart
shown in Figure 4. According to the primary goal of our mechanism, the al-
gorithm will implement two basic functions, the first one is to supervise SC’s
behaviors using TBMCi, another one is to evaluate SC’s behavior risks in run
time and makes the relevant decisions.
. Thus, once the monitor session being activated by user Ci, the algorithm will
first check the Ci’s behavior elements {eid, esrc, edst} using TBMCi. If Ci’s
behavior elements don’t meet TBMCi, algorithm will deny the request directly,
otherwise it goes on to calculate Ci’s new behavior risks using the associated
risk measurement models. Here we only consider two behavior risks, i.e., unau-
thorized access risk (UAR) and access frequency risk (AFR). If PF (UAR)=1
and PF (AFR)=1 at the same time, then Ci is definitely a malicious user be-
cause s/he is trying to access those unauthorised services with abnormal access
frequency. In this case, algorithm will add Ci into the Blacklist and prohibit
Ci from then on. If finding PF (UAR) = 0 and PF (R(AFR) = 0 at the same
time, that represents Ci’s behaviors have no any risks for SP, then algorithm
will return the target service’s interfaces to Ci and update the existed risks with
new calculated values. Otherwise, Ci’s behaviors still have risks, algorithm will
deny Ci’s request in this session, but Ci can also access the system in next new
session.
4. Experiment and Evaluation
. In this section, we implement a prototype to validate the feasibility of pro-
posed mechanism. Following, we first introduce our experimental system. Then
we further evaluate the effectiveness and performance of mechanism under dif-
ferent test scenarios.
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4.1. Experimental System
. In order to validate the feasibility of proposed mechanism, we implement a
prototype system using Eclipse Java EE Neon3 and Apache Tomcat 7.0 con-
tainer. All experiments are conducted on one PC using Intel Core i5 2.5GHz
processors, running Windows 7 platform. The SOA system of designed proto-
type system is shown in Figure 5, which has 3 system services { S0, S1, S2 } and
6 sensitive services { S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8 } respectively. Here we leverage java
server page (JSP) to simulate the real service interface in system. In each JSP,
we have embedded a section of check point script code which is responsible for
collecting user’s behavior elements in run time. We simulate the monitor using
a Java Session Bean, and have implemented the behavior-aware access control
algorithm mentioned in section 4.5 with Java.
. For convenient of establishing different test scenarios rapidly, we also de-
veloped a simple policy management toolkit in our prototype system, whose
screenshot is shown in Figure 6. By means of the toolkit, service providers can
rapidly design different service releasing policy (SRM) and trustful behavior
model (TBM) for different service consumers. Here there are totally 6 privacy
services (Service 1 ∼ Service 6) which could be chosen for releasing to SC. Create
refers to creating a completely new TBM file, Append refers to inserting some
new trust behavior rules into the existed TBM file.
4.2. Evaluation
. We first evaluate user behavior supervision, i.e., once the monitor session
being activated, only access requests having satisfied with TBM could be re-
sponded, while others will be denied. Next we want to validate whether our
mechanism can make effective responses when unauthorized access risk or ac-
cess frequency risk really occur. Finally, we want to evaluate the performance
of our mechanism.
4.2.1. User Behavior Supervision
. This evaluation is to validate whether only access requests satisfied with TBM
can be responded, while others can not. Specifically, we first design two test
scenarios using the policy management toolkit shown in Figure 6. The first
scenario (SRM1) is defined as only Service 1 and Service 5 could be released to
data users, and the second one (SRM2) is defined as only Service 1, Service 3
and Service 4 could be released to data users.
. Based on the SOA system model shown in Figure 5, SRM1 and SRM2 can be
converted into their corresponding TBM models by policy management toolkit
automatically. Next we randomly create 10000 access requests whose range
covers from Service 1 to Service 6. We further design that if a service receives
an access request, it will return a response to system, then we can record all
responses time created by the services having been accessed successfully. After
experiments finished, we can get the final result. Figure 7 shows the execution
result under SRM1 and Figure 8 shows the execution result under SRM2. We
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Figure 1: User behavior supervision evaluation under SRM1.
can observe that, only access requests sent for Service 1 and Service 5 could
be responded under SRM1, while other requests have been denied by monitor.
Taking Service 1 as an example in Figure 7, the access times is totally 1682,
and all accesses for Service 1 have been responded and the average response
time is 51 uS. Under the scenario of SRM2, we find only access requests for
Service 1, Service 3 and Service 4 could be responded accordingly. Hence, the
final results have proofed that our mechanism based on check point and TBM
is surely effective, i.e., only those trustful access requests defined by TBM could
be permitted and responded, while those distrustful requests will be denied
automatically. Thus, by means of the mechanism, system can effectively monitor
SC’s access behaviors in run time.
Service 1 Service 2 Service 3 Service 4 Service 5 Service 6
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Figure 2: User behavior supervision evaluation under SRM2.
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4.2.2. Dynamic Access Authorization
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Figure 3: Dynamic access authorization evaluation under SRM1 and threshold of UAR is set
to 1000 times.
. Dynamic access authorization evaluation is to validate whether our mechanism
can timely terminate a SC’s access authorizations when the SC’s unauthorized
access risk (UAR) or access frequency risk (AFR) really occurs. We first eval-
uate the mechanism under UAR being triggered. We set the threshold of UAR
to 1000 times, i.e., θ(UAR)=1000, which implies that the SC’s access autho-
rization will be early terminated in this session when his or her unauthorized
access times exceeds 1000 times. Then based on this setting, we repeat the
experiments of evaluating user behavior supervision again. When experiments
finished, we get the final result and show them in Figure 9 and Figure 10 re-
spectively. We can observe that, compared with the earlier results shown in
Figure 7 and Figure 8, the access times in new experiment have dramatically
dropped. Taking example of Service 1 in Figure 9, its access times and response
times is only 236 times. That is because SC’s access authorizations have been
early terminated by monitor when unauthorized access times has exceeded 1000
times.
. Next, we evaluate whether our mechanism can make effective decisions when
AFR really occurs. We set the threshold of AFR to 350 times per minute, i.e.,
θ(AFR)=350/min, which implies that when SC’s access frequency exceeds 350
times per minute, his or her access authorizations will be early terminated in this
session. Here access frequency can be either the access frequency of authorised
services or the access frequency of unauthorized services. Specifically, we first
randomly produce 20 groups of access frequencies. Then, under the scenario
SRM1, we access Service 1 with the created random access frequency and record
the response time of Service 1 in each group. After experiments finished, we can
get the final result and show them in Figure 11. We can observe that, Service
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Figure 4: Dynamic access authorization evaluation under SRM2 and threshold of UAR is set
to 1000 times.
1 can still be responded and we can record the response time in first 6 groups
because the access frequency is still under 350 times per minute. But in the
7th group, the frequency is up to 388 times per minute, which has exceeded the
threshold, thus AFR is triggered. From the 7th group on, we can’t record any
response time from Service 1 because SC’s access authorization has been early
terminated in this session.
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Figure 5: Dynamic access authorization evaluation under SRM1 and threshold of AFR is set
to 350 times per minute.
. In conclusion, the final experimental results of dynamic access authorization
evaluation have proofed that our mechanism is truly effective when UAR or AFR
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really occurs. Thus, by means of our mechanism, the system can effectively de-
tect a SC’s malicious behaviors in run time and make effective response towards
these malicious behaviors, i.e., early terminate SC’s access authorization in this
session.
4.2.3. Performance Evaluation
. The performance evaluation is to validate whether our mechanism can still
work well as increasing the scale of TBMCi continuously. The significance of this
experiment is that when SOA system model expands, the scale of TBMCi model
will be expanded synchronously, thus we want to know whether the system can
still work well and its response time can still be acceptable. Specifically, based
on the scenario SRM1, we carry out 10 groups of experiments, and increase the
rule’s number of TBMCi from 100 to 1000 with 100 as the basic unit. For each
group experiment, we record the response time of accessing Service 1, then we
repeat 5 times and calculate an average response time as the final result. After
experiments finished, we can get the final result and we plot them in Figure
12 as follows. We can observe that, as increasing the rule’s number of TBMCi
gradually, the response time of accessing Service 1 is synchronously increased
and nearly linear with the number of trustful behavior rules. And all of response
time can be acceptable.
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Figure 6: Performance evaluation of accessing Service 1 under SRM1.
5. Related Work
. After surveying the related works concerning security policy monitoring for
SOA systems, we found an important direction in this area is to monitor the
business process model and notation (BPMN) [12] of SOA system. These meth-
ods [13, 14, 15, 16, 16, 17] are based on the runtime monitoring of a service
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composition to ensure that the service behaves in compliance with a pre-defined
security policy. If finding policy violations, the monitor program will send alerts
to service provider or system manager. However, these methods didn’t consider
the security requirements of different users. An ideal policy monitoring might
allow different users to be given the opportunity to apply their own security
policies enforced through a combination of design-time and run-time checking
[17]. Compared with these methods, our mechanism doesn’t need to maintain
a BPMN of system, and SRM defined by service provider can be converted
into different security policies (i.e TBM) for different service consumers, then
monitor program can track the user’s behavior using TBM in run time.
. Branimir et al. [18] proposed a performance monitoring approach for WS-
BPEL service compositions. This study depends on business activity monitoring
(BAM), which enables continuous, near real-time monitoring of processes based
on process performance metrics (PPMs). Business people define PPMs based
on business goals, then PPMs are translated to the monitoring models by IT
engineers. In case of severe deviations from planned values, alerts are raised
and notifications are sent to the responsible people. The similar research works
based on BAM are presented in [19, 20, 21]. By means of process engine, these
works can also find abnormal behaviors, but their monitoring target is of a
virtual business process model. Thus, they can only provide near real-time
monitoring results.
. Zuma et al. [22] proposed a dynamic monitoring framework for SOA execution
environment. The designed framework is based on the monitoring scenario
and interceptor mechanism. Monitoring scenario is a group monitoring rules
(interceptor chain) defined by service provider and published in the interceptors
registry of container. Interceptor socket is an independent service which consists
of observer, interceptor chain and data processing engine (CEP). Once a service
in SOA system invoked, the socket will be activated at the same time. The
collected attributes of the service by observer are send to CEP for analysing. If
finding abnormal behaviors, the socket will notify service provider in run time.
The similar research work is presented in [23]. Although these works can find
user’s abnormal behaviors in run time, but compared with our mechanism, they
lack the associated dynamic response mechanism.
. Chen et al. [24] proposed a framework-based runtime monitoring approach
for service-oriented systems. The primary goal of the framework is to support
software engineers by creating high-level views of how services interact, i.e., the
runtime topology of SOA system. Once the listener of a Web service receives an
incoming request, it will forward the message to the proxy, which will parse the
request to obtain the information of the invoking service and interface. Then
the content of the request is delivered to the target service. After the response
sent back, the proxy will stores the addressing information in logging system, by
which service provider can find some abnormal behaviors. Although this study
can establish a high-level system runtime topology, yet it can not find user’s
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abnormal behaviors automatically in run time. In some sense, it is similar to
an offline monitoring mode.
6. Conclusion
. In this paper, we propose a behavior-aware service access control mechanism
using security policy monitoring for SOA system. Firstly, we present a formal
system model for modeling SOA system. Then based on the system model, we
present our proposed mechanism in detail. We introduce two important formal
model, service releasing model and trustful behavior model, in our mechanism.
Next, we present a group risk quantitative measurement models for evaluat-
ing user’s behavior risks in system. Finally, we give the detailed algorithmic
description of behavior-aware access control algorithm in our mechanism. In
order to evaluate the feasibility of proposed mechanism, we implement a proof-
of-concept experimental system. The final experimental results have proofed
that our mechanism can effectively monitor SC’s access behaviors in run time
and truly effective when UAR or AFR really occurs. Thus, by means of our
mechanism, the system can effectively detect a SC’s malicious or misusing be-
haviors and make effective dynamic response towards these malicious behaviors
in run time, i.e., early terminate SC’s access authorization in this session. As
increasing the rule’s number in TBM continuously, our mechanism can still work
well and the response time can be still acceptable.
. The present work is based on the assumption that one service provider has the
ownership of entire SOA system, i.e., all services in SOA system are in one trust
domain. But in open cloud computing environment, SOA system always has
multiple trust domains. Which implies that different service belongs to different
service provider, thus their security policies are also different. Hence, runtime
monitoring mechanism for multiple-domains SOA system is a more challenging
problem and will be as one important part of our ongoing works.
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